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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE 
IMPOSSIBILITY OF "TAKINGS" BY WILDLIFE 
Anna R. C. Caspersen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The reintroduction of seven pairs of gray wolves into Yellowstone 
National Park in February of 19951 sparked a debate between Secre-
tary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt and United States Representative 
Helen Chenoweth2 that aptly illustrates the significant divide in Ameri-
can public opinion concerning the issue of wildlife protection.3 Babbitt 
hailed the reintroduction of the gray wolf into Yellowstone as "an 
important and historic chapter in American history."4 Chenoweth, in 
stark contrast, viewed the wolves as "trespasse[rs] onto the lands of 
Idaho,"5 and Babbitt himself as a "trespasse[r] onto the Constitution 
of the United States."6 
The disagreement as to whether wildlife should be protected even 
on privately owned lands started long before the reintroduction of the 
gray wolf into Yellowstone.7 The 1960s began an era of awareness of 
the fragile and finite quality of our natural resources, specifically 
* Managing Editor, 1995-1996, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Tom Kenworthy, Babbitt Finds Relocation Program Has Hill's Wolves Growling at Him, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1995, at A23 (15 Canadian gray wolves were released into central Idaho 
in January, 1995, and 14 wolves were released into Yellowstone in February, 1995). 
2Id. Chenoweth (R-Idaho) is infamous among environmentalists for questioning whether 
salmon can be endangered when it is readily available in supermarkets. Id. 
3Id. 
4Id. The gray wolf, exterminated from the West half a decade ago, was the only original 
wildlife missing from the park. Id. 
6Id. Chenoweth suggested that a better solution for controlling Yellowstone's unmanageably 
large elk population would be to have a hunting season in Yellowstone. Id. 
6 Kenworthy, supra note 1, at A23. 
7 See Douglas H. Chadwick, Dead or Alive, The Endangered Species Act, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, 
357 
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wildlife, that culminated in the passage of the Endangered Species 
Act in 1973.8 Today, when remarks such as Chenoweth's indicate a 
political backlash against the protection of wildlife, it becomes even 
more crucial to pinpoint if there is a right to insist on wildlife protec-
tion, and if there is, where the right comes from and how it can be 
defended.9 
Many people believe there is a special duty to preserve wildlife, 
whether motivated by the desire to emulate Noah and his Ark by 
saving God's creatures, or by the belief that we have much to learn 
scientifically from other animals.lO Victor Hugo suggested that, "[iJn 
the relations of man with animals, with the flowers, with the objects 
of creation, there is a great ethic, scarcely perceived as yet, which will 
at length break forth into light."n This special duty, or "great ethic," 
to which Hugo refers is recognized legally in the ancient doctrine of 
the public trust.12 
The public trust doctrine creates a legal obligation for the state to 
hold certain natural resources in trust for the people, and a duty for 
the state to protect and to preserve these resources.13 As Professor 
Joseph Sax commented in his landmark article, The Public Trust 
Doctrine In Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 
"[oJf all the concepts known to American law, only the public trust 
doctrine seems to have the breadth and substantive content which 
make it useful as a tool of general application for citizens seeking to 
develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management 
problems."14 The public trust doctrine has continued to stress the duty 
to protect and preserve natural resources as the doctrine has ex-
panded its breadth to meet the challenges to natural resources posed 
by modern day America. 
This Comment argues that just as wolves have not "trespassed" 
onto the lands of Idaho,15 those advocating the protection of wildlife 
March 1995, at 7. Chadwick states that the 1960s began an "era of new found environmental 
awareness .... " Id. 
8 The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994); Chadwick, supra note 7, at 7. 
9 See Kenworthy, supra note 1, at A23 (the House Public Lands and Resources Committee is 
dominated now by conservative Republicans such as Chenoweth and Barbara Cubin (R-Wyo». 
10 See Chadwick, supra note 7, at 12. 
11 Id. at 7. 
12 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine In Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 473 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine] (the 
public trust doctrine allows private citizens to sue on behalf of the interests of the public at 
large). 
13 See id. at 486-87 for Sax's outline of the public trust doctrine. 
14Id. at 474. 
15 Wolves were eliminated from the Northern Rockies 50 years ago when they were "poisoned, 
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are not "trespassing" onto the Constitution of the United States.!6 
Those who find the protection of wildlife to be a trespass on the 
Constitution point to the provision of the Fifth Amendment, which 
states "[n]or shall private property be taken for public use without 
just compensation."17 Some private landowners, loggers, and ranchers 
argue that efforts to protect wildlife that result in restrictions on land 
usage, or that increase the risk that livestock may be attacked, con-
stitute a "taking" of private property requiring compensation.18 This 
Comment takes the position that the public trust doctrine trumps the 
Fifth Amendment prohibition against takings without compensation 
in regards to wildlife.19 The premise of this argument is that wildlife, 
like water and air, is held in trust by the government for the public's 
benefit.20 The public trust doctrine holds that wild animals' right to 
use land to forage and find shelter existed prior to the property rights 
of private landowners.21 Therefore, when wildlife causes damage to 
private property,22 no taking occurs and the government is not respon-
sible for compensation.23 
Section II of this Comment outlines the evolution of the public trust 
doctrine through the doctrine's early history and pays particular at-
shot, doused with gasoline, drawn and quartered and otherwise slaughtered to make the 
Northern Rockies safe for cattle and sheep." Sharon Begley and Daniel Glick, The Return of 
the Native, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 23,1995, at 53. 
16 See Kenworthy, supra note 1, at A23. 
17 U.S. CaNST. amend. V. 
18 See, e.g., Chadwick, supra note 7, at 30 (a timberman from Oregon states "[tJhe feds say to 
protect the owls and salmon we need a 300-foot setback from streams even on company lands. 
I think that's a 'taking' of private property."); Michael Milstein, Wolves Return to Yellowstone 
Homeward Bound; Biologists Ranchers View Reintroduction Plan Differently, THE SAN DIEGO 
UNION-'I'RIB., Jan. 18, 1995, at E-1 (the American Farm Bureau Federation fears wolves will 
burden ranchers and become "[aJ convenient tool for environmentalists wanting to lock up public 
lands."); but see William K. Stevens, Triumph and Loss As Wolves Return to Yellowstone, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1995 at C4. (Since reintroduction, wolves have not killed any livestock and 
experience shows "[ w Jolves prefer the wild game with which they have evolved over the 
millenniums."). 
19 See Thomas A. Campbell, The Public Trust, Whats it Worth?, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 73, 
86-7 (1994) (suggesting there is no taking when private lands are preserved for the public). 
20 See infra notes 99-115 and accompanying text. 
21 See Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to 
Include Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723, 735 (1989) (arguing it is in human interest to 
include the protection of wildlife in the sphere of the public trust doctrine). 
22 The Yellowstone wolves will help to keep the park's herds of bison (4,000), deer (30,000), 
and elk (60,000) healthy by culling the population by an estimated 1,200 annually by the year 
2002. They are also expected to kill up to 20 cattle and 110 sheep. Begley and Glick, supra note 
15, at 53. 
23 Meyers, supra note 21, at 735. 
---------------------------
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tention to the theoretical roots of the doctrine that are the underpin-
nings of its relevance to the protection of wildlife today.24 Section III 
of this Comment discusses the development of the public trust doc-
trine in modern American case law, and focuses on the doctrine's 
marked expansion.25 Section IV of this Comment establishes the grounds 
for including wildlife within the scope of the public trust doctrine.26 
Finally, Section V of this Comment argues that the public trust doc-
trine offers a solution to the current controversy surrounding "tak-
ings" by wild animals such as the gray wolfP 
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
The public trust doctrine, and the corresponding idea that wildlife 
is owned by all of us, has its foundation in Roman law.28 The Romans 
developed the public trust doctrine to explain the ownership status 
of things that cannot readily be possessed by individuals, such as the 
air, the water, and wildlife.29 The Romans categorized these elements 
as held in trust by the government for the use and enjoyment of 
everyone.30 This concept was incorporated in the laws of Medieval 
England where, although the King officially owned all "public" land, 
the public trust doctrine established the commoners' right to use the 
King's land.3! The King's land was therefore "immemorial liable to 
certain general rights of egress and regress, for fishing, trading, and 
other uses claimed and used by his subjects."32 From English law, the 
public trust doctrine followed colonists to North America.33 After the 
American Revolution, when there was no longer a King to hold the 
public trust, the responsibility passed intact to the several states, 
where it remains today.34 
24 See infra notes 28--115 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 116--64 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 165-249 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 250--99 and accompanying text. 
28 Sax, The Public '!rust Doctrine, supra note 12, at 474. 
29 Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public '!rust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. 




33 Paul Sarahan, Wetlands Protection Post-Lucas: Implications of the Public '!rust Doctrine 
on Takings Analysis, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 537, 558 (1994). 
34 Id. 
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A. A General Explanation 
The concept behind the public trust doctrine is a simple one: certain 
public resources are enjoyed by everyone, and these resources are 
subject to demands which necessitate that the state act as trustee to 
prevent their abuse.35 Nevertheless, there is much confusion and de-
bate among legal scholars as to the authority and ultimate scope of 
the public trust doctrine.36 
A helpful way of understanding the public trust doctrine is to look 
to the doctrine's parallels with private trustS.37 As with private trusts, 
there are four key elements to a public trust.3S First, there must be 
the "res," the object or thing with which the trust is concerned.39 In 
a public trust this is any wild element that cannot be owned individu-
ally, such as air, water, and-most importantly for the purposes of this 
Comment-wildlife.40 Second, there must be a trustee, who is charged 
with the responsibility of acting in the best interests of the trusty 
The trustee's duty is to manage the assets to further the purposes of 
the trust.42 In a public trust, the trustee is the state. The third element 
of a trust is the beneficiary, who holds the real or "equitable" title to 
the assets of the trust.43 It is the beneficiary whom the trustee seeks 
to benefit in the management of the trust.44 In a public trust, the 
beneficiary of the trust is the public. Finally, there is the "settlor," the 
creator of the assets of the trust. 45 In a public trust protecting wildlife, 
the settlor "depends on your theological inclinations."46 
35 See ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 374-75 (1992) (explaining how the public trust doctrine is related to the concept 
of a private trust). 
36 See id. at 412. Professor Plater notes that "the trust's antagonists have not yet found a 
countervailing momentum to the evolution of public trust case law. At some level, no matter 
how uncertain its ultimate trajectory, the doctrine appears to fulfill some old and newly re-dis-
covered needs." [d. at 411. 
37 [d. at 375; see also JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
ESTATES 435-41 (4th ed. 1990) (for more on the traditional structure of trusts). 
38 PLATER ET AL., supra note 35, at 374-75. 
39 [d. at 375. 
40 See infra notes 161Hi9 and accompanying text. 
41 PLATER ET AL., supra note 35, at 374. 
42 [d. 
43 [d. at 375. 
44 [d. 
45 [d. 
46 PLATER ET AL., supra note 35, at 375. Advocates of the public trust doctrine are content 
to leave the identity of the settlor open, suggesting God, Mother Nature, or natural law as the 
creator of the trust. In contrast to the majority of legal scholars writing about the public trust 
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The public trust doctrine recognizes the public's common concern 
with the maintenance and purity of natural resources and protects 
these resources from " ... the destabilizing disappointment of expec-
tations held in common but without formal recognition such as title."47 
These global expectations held in common are vulnerable to what has 
been described as the "tyranny of small decisions."48 This term de-
scribes small individual decisions that alone have a negligible impact 
on a resource, but when multiplied by hundreds of similar small 
decisions can have a major effect on the environment.49 The irony is 
that if all the people who made this small decision had been informed 
of the group impact, most may have chosen to abstain.50 The public 
trust doctrine serves to act as the guardian of the collective environ-
mental consciousness.51 
B. Roman Origins 
The public trust doctrine originated in Roman law as part of the 
Romans' efforts at rational classification.52 The Romans found that in 
the realm outside of private property there were several categories 
doctrine, Professor James L. Huffman, one of the public trust doctrine's greatest critics, argues 
that the public trust doctrine cannot be understood as a trust without a concrete settlor. 
Professor Huffman claims that without a settlor, the "terms of the trust" cannot be determined 
and that, "[iJn a society of laws where people have expectations built upon the foundation of 
property rights, something a bit more certain is required." James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of 
Water: The Public Trust in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 538, 542 (1989) 
[hereinafter Huffman, A Fish Out of WaterJ; but see Timothy Patrick Brady, Note, "But Most 
of it Belongs to Those Yet to be Born:" The Public Trust Doctrine, NEPA, and the Stewardship 
Ethic, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 621, 622 (1990) (as far back as the story of Adam and Eve, 
where God created Eden for the common possession of Adam, Eve, and their children, it is 
taught that "the perfect state is not the private possession of property, but common owner-
ship"); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 12, at 474 (just as there are expectations 
built on private property rights, there are also public expectations as to the maintenance of wild 
resources that only can be protected through the public trust). 
47 Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 29, at 186-94. 
48 Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine 
in Search of a Theory, 15 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 424 (1991) (citing William Odum, 




51 See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 12, at 559-60. Sax states that in public trust 
cases frequently "[aJ diffuse majority is made subject to the will of a concerted minority. For 
self-interested minorities often have an undue influence on the public resource decisions of 
legislative and administrative bodies and cause these bodies to ignore broadly based public 
interests." ld. 
52 Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 29, at 186 n.6. 
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of items and elements that could not be owned individually.53 There 
were temples owned by the gods, public buildings owned by the state, 
and natural elements such as air, water, and wildlife that were owned 
in common by everyone, or by no one.54 The Latin terms for the latter 
type of ownership are res communis and res nullius.55 Res communis 
described things that were the property of everyone, such as water, 
air, and light.56 Res nullius referred to things that were incapable of 
belonging to anyone-the Romans included wild animals among such 
things.57 
Roman public trust law is most detailed about water rights, for it 
was water, of all resources, that was subject to the greatest public 
demand.58 Critics of the expansion of the public trust doctrine claim 
that when the Roman Emperor Justinian stated, "[b]y the law of 
nature, these things are common to mankind: the air, running water, 
the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea ... ,"59 he was express-
ing the intention to limit the doctrine strictly to water rights.60 Yet 
Roman law held that wildlife was held in common possession.61 The 
fact that Roman law focused on navigable waters rather than on 
wildlife, was due to public need and was not a limitation of the doc-
trine.62 Moreover, the public trust doctrine has evolved so much over 
time that it is wrong to depend on ancient Roman law as a modern 




56 Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Prop-
erty Cases about the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 802 (1979). 
57Id. at 803 n.196. 
58 See Scott W. Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious?, 1 ENVTL. LAW & LITIG. 
107,111 (1986) (the relationship ofthe public trust doctrine to water rights is the result of water 
resources being subject to great public demand). 
59 THOMAS C. SANDERS, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN WITH ENGLISH INTRODUCTION, 
TRANSLATION, AND NOTES, 158 (1984). 
60 Critics suggest this limitation even though Justinian explicitly also mentioned air. See 
Huffman, A Fish Out of Water, supra note 46, at 544-45; see also Richard J. Lazarus, Changing 
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust 
Doctrine,71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 634 n.12 (1986). 
61 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522-23 (1896), rev'd on other grounds, Hughes v. Okla-
homa, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); see also, Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1,71 (1821) (Justinian applied the 
public trust to "the air, the running water, the sea, the fish, and the wild beasts ... "). 
62 Reed, supra note 58, at 11I. 
63 Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 29, at 186; see also Johanna Searle, 
Note, Private Property Rights Yield to The Environmental Crisis: Perspectives on the Public 
Trust Doctrine, 41 S.C. L. REV. 897, 899 (1990) (unlike today's public trust doctrine Roman 
public trust law did not provide a means for the public to obtain legal relief against the state). 
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in the foundation that ancient society laid for the policy that there are 
certain things, "by the law of nature ... common to mankind."64 
c. English Roots 
In Medieval England, as in Rome, common water rights continued 
to be essential to commerce and navigation, but the public now was 
faced additionally with the need for land for grazing and hunting.65 
The early English legal right of access is different from the Roman 
public trust doctrine in that all "public" lands were owned exclusively 
by the King, rather than by everyone or no one as in Rome.66 To 
support the feudal economy, however, the King had to grant to the 
public a legal right of access to use his land for grazing, hunting, 
fishing, and foraging.67 This interest was designed not to protect natu-
ral resources from overuse, but rather to ensure that the King did not 
hoard all the natural resources.68 
Like Roman public trust law, the importance of Medieval English 
law is not in its precedent, which has little relevance today.69 Rather 
the importance of the history of the public trust doctrine in Medieval 
England is to understand the origins of the idea of common ownership 
of natural resources.70 
D. Beginnings of The Public Trust Doctrine in America 
With the American Revolution, wildlife, or "ferae naturae," pre-
viously owned by the King, passed into the possession of the people 
of the newly independent states by virtue of the "equal footing doc-
trine."71 The states inherited the King's duty of holding public re-
64 SANDERS, supra note 59, at 158. 
65 See Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 29, at 190 (peasants often 
subsisted on what they could gather from the Medieval commons). 
66 Searle, supra note 63, at 899-900. 
67 PLATER ET AL., supra note 35, at 366 (quoting Joseph L. Sax, Defending the Environment: 
A Strategy for Citizen Action, 163--65 (1970)) [hereinafter Sax, Defending the Environment]. 
68 Rieser, supra note 48, at 415. 
69 Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 12, at 485. Sax comments that "[o]nly the most 
manipulative of historical readers could extract much binding precedent from what happened a 
few centuries ago in England." Id. 
7°Id. 
71 See Searle, supra note 63, at 902. The equal footing doctrine held that the original thirteen 
states and those succeeding them were given rights equal to those previously held by the King 
within the states' borders. Id. at 902 n.45. 
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sources in trust for the people.72 The famous case of Pierson v. Post73 
illustrates, however, that as in England, the prevalent concern with 
wildlife in early American society was with the possessing of animals 
as private property rather than with the protection of animals as a 
public resource.74 In Pierson v. Post, a gentleman hunter loses the fox 
he had chased all day with his hounds to a "saucy intruder" who easily 
captures the fox in its exhausted state.75 The hunter brings suit for 
the possession of the fox's pelt, but is unsuccessful because the stand-
ard of ownership is held to be the actual deprivation of the animal's 
naturalliberty.76 Pierson v. Post reflects the belief among Americans 
at this time that there was an endless frontier and that the wilderness 
was not a precious resource to be protected, but rather "an enemy to 
be conquered and tamed."77 There appeared to be a never-ending 
supply of raw materials and, as Professor Sax comments, to the extent 
"land [was] doing something-for example, harboring wild animals-
. . . getting rid of the natural, or at least domesticating it, was a 
primary task of the European settlers of North America."78 
E. The Growth of the Public Trust in America 
With Americans' discovery that the endless frontier was an illusion, 
came the development of the public trust doctrine as a tool of conser-
vation.79 The frontier mentality of a land of infinite resources, where 
one could make a mistake and move onto fresh ground, led to a vision 
72 See, e.g., Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Washington R.R. Co., 255 U.S. 56, 63, 65 (1921) 
(Washington became owner of the navigable waters within its boundaries upon becoming a 
state.); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 392-94 (1876) (Virginia holds the beds of its navigable 
waters and the fish within them "[s]o far as they are capable of ownership while running," in 
trust for the common benefit of its citizens.). 
733 CaL T. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
74 Wild fox seen as "a wild and noxious beast," "cunning and ruthless," and "a pirate," whose 
death was a benefit to society. [d. at 180-8I. 
75 [d. at 175, 18I. 
76 [d. at 175. 
77 Campbell, supra note 19, at 74; see also PLATER ET AL., supra note 35, at 412. The public 
trust doctrine addresses the prospect, hard for many Americans to face, that perhaps private 
property owners do not have the right to do anything they want with their land. See PLATER 
ET AL., supra note 35, at 412. 
78 Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1442 (1993). 
79 Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 12, at 547. Sax describes the evolution of much 
public trust law as "[a]n effort to retreat from the excessive generosity of early legislatures and 
public land management agencies." [d. 
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of our resources as disposable.so This vision was exposed as false and 
Americans were faced with the phenomenon of the "tragedy of the 
commons."81 While the public trust doctrine initially had been used to 
allow public access to natural resources, the doctrine shifted to a 
preservationist role.82 
The extension of the public trust doctrine in American case law 
parallels the growing public desire to protect the country's remaining 
natural resources. The earliest American cases mentioning the public 
trust doctrine extended the doctrine beyond its traditional focus on 
water rights. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the 1810 case of 
Carson v. Blazer extended the British recognition of public rights in 
the ocean and navigable waters-those waters the King did not own 
under British law-to nonnavigable inland waterways.83 Nonnavigable 
inland waterways were privately owned in England and the American 
inclusion of nonnavigable inland waterways in the public trust was a 
significant extension of public rights.84 The New Jersey Supreme Court 
adopted this extension of the public trust doctrine in the 1821 case of 
Arnold v. Mundy.85 Harking back to the language of the Emperor 
Justinian and the idea that natural resources are res communes and 
res nullius,86 the court held that plaintiff Arnold's purchase of Raritan 
Bay was subject to a prior common public property right to use the 
bay.87 In Martin v. Wadell, an 1842 case concerning property rights in 
oyster beds in the same Raritan Bay, the United States Supreme 
Court affirmatively abolished the traditional British restriction that 
80 PLATER ET AL., supra note 35, at 412. 
81 See id. at 33-40. The "tragedy of the commons" explains how people faced with a finite 
resource will continue to place demands on the resource until it is depleted completely. Id. at 
34. Although the end result is disaster, if the first person had not placed the added demand on 
the common resource, a second person would have, and would have gotten the immediate 
benefit, therefore in the short run it makes sense to overload the resource. Id.; see generally, 
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
82 See Brady, supra note 46, at 631. The public trust doctrine's initial emphasis on public access 
to resources was a factor in precipitating the tragedy of the commons. See id. Today, the focus 
of the public trust doctrine is on preservation of natural resources rather than on their use. See 
id. The idea that public resources should be protected from over use by privatization takes from 
the public its right to enjoy nature. See id; but see R. Prescott Jaunich, The Environment, The 
Free Market, and Property Rights: Post-Lucas Privatization of the Public Trust, 15 PUBLIC 
LAND L. REV. 167, 192 (1994) (praising the British and Scottish custom of charging up to £100 
a day for fishing in private, non-tidal waters). 
83 Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 475 (Pa. 1810). 
84 See id. at 476. 
85 6 N .T.L. 1, 70-71 (1821). 
86 See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. 
87 Arnold, 6 N.T.L. at 71. 
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waters need to be affected by tides to be covered by the public trust 
doctrine.88 These three early cases illustrate how the American courts, 
basing their reasoning on the Roman roots of the public trust doc-
trine, extended the public trust doctrine further than the English 
courts, which had been limited by the fact that ownership was vested 
in the King rather than in the people. 
The principles of the public right to access certain water beds relied 
on in Carson, Arnold, and Martin were further brought to light in 
Illinois Central v. Illinois.89 Illinois Central is the most well-known 
example of a state regretting its generosity with public lands.90 In 
1869, the Illinois legislature gave a two-mile-wide radius of land around 
Lake Michigan to the Illinois Central Railroad.91 By 1873, the legisla-
ture regretted giving away this extremely valuable land.92 The legis-
lature relied on the public trust doctrine in its claim that the gift was 
invalid.93 The legislature argued that it had not had the authority to 
abdicate control over the navigable waters of Lake Michigan because 
the legislature was merely a trustee of the land.94 The United States 
Supreme Court agreed, holding that the land was "[h]eld in trust for 
the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the 
waters, carryon commerce over them, and have the liberty of fishing 
therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties."95 
Illinois Central stands for the proposition that where a govern-
ment does something with a public resource that appears to favor 
private interests over the public interests the government is sup-
posed to be holding in trust, the Court will regard that decision with 
great skepticism.96 This watershed case brought to the fore three 
related principles of the public trust doctrine: 
[f]irst, that certain interests-like the air and sea-have such an 
importance to the citizenry as a whole that it would be unwise to 
88 See Martin v. Wadell, 41 U.S. 367, 368; see also Harry R. Bader, Antaeus and the Public 
Tl'ust Doctrine?: A New Approach to Substantive Environmental Protection in the Common 
Law, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 749, 751 (1992). 
89 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
90 Sax, The Public Tl'ust Doctrine, supra note 12, at 489 (Sax termed Illinois Central "the 
lodestar in American public trust law"). 
91 [d. 
92 [d. 
93 See id. 
94 See id. 
95 Sax, The Public Tl'ust Doctrine, supra note 12, at 489-90 (quoting Illinois Central v. Illinois, 
146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892)). 
96 [d. at 490. 
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make them the subject of private ownership. Second, that they 
partake so much of the bounty of nature, rather than of individual 
enterprise, that they should be made freely available to the entire 
citizenry without regard to economic status. And finally, that it is 
a principle purpose of government to promote the interests of the 
general public rather than to redistribute public goods from broad 
public uses to restricted private benefit .... 97 
These three principles discussed by the Supreme Court in Illinois 
Central serve as the basis for the expansion of the public trust doc-
trine in modern American public trust law.98 
The protection of wildlife fits well within these three principles. 
First, wildlife, like the air and sea, is of great importance to citizens 
as a whole. Aside from the spiritual value of wildlife to many as "God's 
creatures," some wildlife gives great aesthetic pleasure, and has been 
shown to have scientific value to humans.99 Second, wildlife is the 
"bounty of nature," as its existence has nothing to do with "individual 
enterprise." 100 Finally, ensuring that wildlife is "freely available" for 
the enjoyment of the public depends on careful management by the 
government as trustee. 
F. Current Law on Public Trust and Wildlife 
Beginning in the 1960s, the state of the environment became a 
public concern, and by the 1970s and 1980s this concern was being 
translated into law.101 Most notable for seeking to protect wildlife are 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973102 and the Marine Protec-
tion, Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) of 1988.103 Environmen-
tally conscious legislative acts have been labeled "trustee statutes" 
by one commentator in recognition of the fact that the purpose behind 
the statutes is to oppose wanton private use of natural resources that 
destroy the public "estate."l04 
97 PLATER ET AL., supra note 35, at 366 (quoting Sax, Defending the Environment, supra note 
67, at 163--65). 
98 See Searle, supra note 63, at 901 (the principles of Illinois Central are the essentials of 
modern day public trust litigation). 
99 Bader, supra note 88, at 755. Bader states that "[a]n overly simplified biotic community no 
doubt would lack many of the qualities and vital forces upon which we depend for sound bodies 
and minds." [d. 
100 PLATER ET AL. supra note 35, at 366 (quoting Sax, Defending the Environment, supra 
note 67, at 163--65). 
101 Chadwick, supra note 7, at 7. 
102 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994). 
103 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-45 (1994). 
104 Campbell, supra note 19, at 74-75. 
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Concurrent with the fostering of environmentally conscious legis-
lation and the growing recognition that there are public rights and 
duties in natural resources, came the further expansion of the public 
trust doctrine.l05 As discussed above, early American public trust 
cases abandoned the traditional English rules which found a public 
trust interest only in navigable water or water subject to tides.106 
With the re-introduction of the public trust doctrine by Professor Sax 
in 1970,107 there was a far more dramatic expansion of the doctrine. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, the public trust doctrine was applied far beyond 
water to parks,Ios archaeological artifacts,I09 beach access over up-
lands,l1O critical upland areas surrounding a redwood forest,111 trees 
damaged by oil spills,112 and wildlife.113 At present, the question of just 
how expansive the public trust doctrine can be, remains open.114 Once 
the doctrine was accepted as transcending merely a limitation on 
water rights, it arguably protected all natural resources.115 
III. A PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE REMEDY FOR THE "TAKINGS" 
DILEMMA 
A. The Public Trust Doctrine and "Takings" 
The tradition of the public trust conflicts directly with the far more 
widely known and highly valued tradition of private property.116 Many 
people feel strongly that they have a right to defend their property 
105 Brady, supra note 46, at 631. 
106 See supra notes 79-100 and accompanying text. 
107 PLATER ET AL., supra note 35, at 374. 
108 Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18-19 (Ill. 1970) (holding that parklands 
were in trust for the people, but that using parklands for a school was not obviously against the 
interests of the trust); Gould v. Mount Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 125--26 
(Mass. 1966) (holding that a 1953 legislative agreement to lease Reservation for ski resort 
construction was a violation of public trust doctrine since public interest is in preserving the 
unspoiled natural forest, not in having it sold for a private commercial venture). 
109 Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (Ill. App. 4 Dist. 1984). 
110 Matthews v. Bay Head Imprvm'nt Ass'n., 471 A.2d 355, 360-63 (N.J. 1984), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 821 (1984). 
111 Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 292-93 (N.D. Cal. 1975), 
modified, 424 F. Supp. 172 (1976). 
112 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 671 (1st Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981). 
113 In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
114 PLATER ET AL., supra note 35, at 394. 
115 See id. Professor Plater comments that "[o]nce the public trust genie has been released 
from the bottle ... it arguably can cast its shadow over situations previously unknown." [d. 
116 Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act and Private 
Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 415 (1994). Meltz states that" [w]hile property rights are well 
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from any outside intrusions.ll7 Other people believe that the cost of 
public progress should be borne by the community at large which 
benefits from conservation and protection of private land, and not by 
a few unfortunate individuals. us However reasonable this latter view 
may seem, as Professor Sax explains, "[a]ny attempt to apply this 
concept to property assertedly owned by the whole public is plainly 
incongruous."u9 
Key to understanding the public trust is recognition that the conflict 
is between the survival of our common natural resources and individ-
ual economic interests; not, as Professor Huffman sets it up, between 
"new public recreational rights" and private property.120 Although 
Huffman is correct that preventing the government from taking pri-
vate property without compensation is a constitutional right essential 
to our system of government, Huffman fails to realize that the gov-
ernment has the additional duty to protect and manage property that 
is lawfully owned by us all.121 The major implication of the public trust 
doctrine for private property rights-specifically the potential of the 
doctrine to cause unexpected economic losses-has led to resistance 
to its expansion.122 
B. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi 
The earlier holdings of Carson v. Blazer,t'1.3 Arnold v. Mundy,t24 
Martin v. Wadell,t25 and Illinois Central v. Illinois,126 which staked 
analyzed in our legal and moral tradition, our ethical duties to endangered species are novel and 
not universally accepted." [d. 
117 See Lauri Alsup, Note, The Right to Protect Private Property, 21 ENVTL. L. 209, 227-29 
(1991). 
118 Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 12, at 479. On the other hand, Professor 
Huffman challenges the expansion of the public trust doctrine on just this front, stating: "[a]s 
the environmentalists are fond of saying, there is no such thing as a free lunch. The question is 
whether the lunch will be paid for by those who eat it or by those whose property is taken 
without compensation. It is in the public interest that it be the former." James L. Huffman, 
Avoiding the Takings Clause Through the Myth of Public Rights: The Public 7rust and Re-
served Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 171,210 (1987) [hereinafter 
Huffman, Myth of Public Rights]. 
119 Sax, The Public 7rust Doctrine, supra note 12, at 479. 
120 Huffman, Myth of Public Rights, supra note 118, at 207. 
121 Sax, The Public 7rust Doctrine, supra note 12, at 479. 
122 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 35, at 405-06. Professor Plater comments that "[t]he public 
trust doctrine has major implications for private property rights ... the trust doctrine can 
create unexpected economic losses, anger, and political backlash." [d. 
123 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810). 
124 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821). 
125 41 U.S. 367 (1842). 
126 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
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out the territory for the public trust in waters regardless of the 
traditional requirements of navigability, were confirmed in a modern-
day setting with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi. 127 The dispute between Phillips 
Petroleum and the State of Mississippi occurred when the State granted 
oil and gas leases to private parties in land underneath a bayou that 
Phillips Petroleum had held title to for over one hundred years.128 In 
what the dissent held to be a "radical expansion of the historical limits 
of the public trust,"129 the United States Supreme Court held that the 
State's assertion of the public trust in the bayou was valid despite 
Phillips Petroleum's claim that its settled private expectations were 
upset.130 The Court held that lands under tidal waters were held in 
public trust by the State.l31 The rejection of Phillips Petroleum's set-
tled expectations argument, despite the fact that the company had 
paid taxes on the land for more than a century, is indicative of the 
power of the public trust.132 
The Supreme Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum gave the pub-
lic trust doctrine the authority it needed to face its most powerful 
contestor-private property rights protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment. In recognizing that some assets cannot be taken without special 
permission from the state, the Court in Phillips Petroleum "fortif[ied] 
the operation of the trust as a state tool for economic and environ-
mental control of significant resources [and legitimized] legislatures 
and activists who choose to assert the public interest more forcefully 
in an age of ever-increasing property conflicts."l33 
C. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council134 
A brief review and interpretation of the current takings law is 
helpful to gain an understanding of the relationship of the public trust 
doctrine to takings. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution requires that just compensation be provided for private 
127 484 u.s. 469 (1988). 
128 Id. at 472. 
129 Id. at 493 (O'Connor J., dissenting). 
130 Id. at 481-84. 
131 Id. at 475. 
132 See Searle, supra note 63, at 902-03 (explaining the serious implications of Phillips Petro-
leum on the ''right'' of private landowners to do what they want with their land). 
133 Id. at 904 (quoting Stephen A. DeLaw, Note, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi and the 
Public Trust Doctrine: Strengthening Sovereign Interest in Tidal Property, 38 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 571, 597-98 (1989». 
134 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), on remand, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992). 
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property taken for public use. l35 Prior to Justice Oliver Wendell Hol-
mes's interpretation of the takings clause in Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon136 in 1922, courts found compensable takings only where 
there were "direct appropriations" of property or the "functional 
equivalent of a practical ouster of possession."137 In Pennsylvania 
Coal, Justice Holmes recognized that "[g]overnment hardly could go 
on if to some extent values incident to property could not be dimin-
ished without paying for every such change in the generallaw,"l38 but 
held that the general rule should be that if a regulation goes "too far" 
there is a taking.139 This vague and abstract standard was solidified 
by holdings in the 1970s that found regulations that effect permanent 
physical invasions on private property go "too far," as do regulations 
that deny a private property owner "all economically viable use,"140 
of land even in the absence of a permanent physical invasion.l41 
The 1992 Supreme Court case Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, further defined when regulations constitute governmental 
takings.l42 In 1986, the plaintiff Lucas had purchased two beachside 
lots on the Isle of Palms, a barrier island off of Charleston, South 
Carolina, for $975,000.143 Lucas was prevented from fulfilling what he 
claimed were plans to build on the lots, when, in 1988, South Carolina 
passed the Beachfront Management Act, forbidding further develop-
ment of the fragile barrier beaches.l44 Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, held that the statute's prohibition of development, although 
made to protect a fragile natural area, was a "taking" of Lucas's two 
beachside lots because he no longer had any profitable use for the 
lots.145 
On its face, Lucas does not bode well for the public trust doctrine: 
by holding that Lucas had a right to full compensation for his prop-
erty, the Supreme Court seemed to restrict the circumstances under 
135 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
136 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
137 E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-40 (1982). 
138 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. 
139 [d. at 415. 
140 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987) (emphasis 
added); Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978). 
141 Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843, 851-52 (D. Wyo. 1994). 
142 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2889-2902 (1992), on remand, 424 
S.E.2d 488 (S.C. 1992). 
143 [d. at 2889. 
144 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-250-360 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1993). 
146 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2898-99. 
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which state and federal governments can act to protect natural re-
sources without being forced to compensate affected landowners.146 
Upon closer examination, however, two questions remain open, de-
spite the fact that the Supreme Court appeared to refuse to provide 
laws furthering environmental protection any special exemption from 
liability for takings.147 The first question is how much a private prop-
erty right has to be infringed on for a taking to occur?148 The answer 
to this question depends on what part of a parcel of land is looked at.149 
The second question is to what extent the landowner's proposed use 
must fit within the landowner's "reasonable" or "distinct investment-
backed" expectations?150 The Supreme Court held that an expectation 
is not "reasonable" if, due to "background principles of nuisance and 
property law," the expectation is not part of the title to the property 
to begin with.151 On remand, the Supreme Court of South Carolina 
found that there were no state principles of nuisance law that would 
forbid Lucas's development of his property.152 The state court how-
ever, ignored the second part of the exception for "background prin-
ciples of property law," and did not analyze possible public trust rights 
in the beach front property.153 
The public trust doctrine has long been established in American law 
as a background principle of property law.154 Therefore, under the 
Lucas exception for "background principles of property law," the 
public trust doctrine trumps the takings clause.155 Property not pri-
vate to begin with cannot be "taken" by protective governmental 
regulations.156 As Professor Huffman, a critic of the public trust, la-
ments: 
146 Sarahan, supra note 33, at 550. 
147 Meltz, supra note 116, at 407. 
148 Sarahan, supra note 33, at 555-56. 
149 See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7; see also PLATER ET AL., supra note 35, at 460 (arguing 
that the baseline for determining whether there has been a taking should be the entire parcel 
of property not just the regulated area). 
150 Sarahan, supra note 33, at 556. 
151 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02. 
162 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 485-86 (S.C. 1992). 
153 PLATER ET AL., supra note 35, at Supp. 154. Professor Plater believes that "Justice Scalia's 
opinion invites continued definition of public trust rights as an integral part of the balance he 
calls for in Lucas." [d. 
154 See supra notes 79-100 and accompanying text. 
155 See Huffman, A Fish Out of Water, supra note 46, at 558-59 (Huffman, although critical of 
this interpretation of the public trust doctrine, provides a good summary of how the public trust 
doctrine trumps the takings clause). 
156 See id. 
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[b ]ecause public trust rights are understood to predate other 
property rights, their status in relation to those other rights 
claims is always prior in time, and therefore, superior in right. 
There can be no claim that enforcement of a public trust right 
results in a taking because individual property rights are by defini-
tion subject to prior public rights .... Because the public trust 
right is prior, there is nothing to be taken from the individual.157 
The "mammoth exemption"l58 to the takings rule left by Lucas 8 rec-
ognition of traditional principles of property law should allow state 
governments to use the public trust doctrine to protect wildlife where 
the interests of wildlife and private property conflict. 
Shortly after the Lucas decision, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
demonstrated the ability of the public trust doctrine to overcome the 
takings clause in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach.159 The plaintiffs in 
Stevens, like Lucas, were owners of vacant seaside lots.l60 The plain-
tiffs claimed that the City of Cannon Beach's refusal to allow the 
plaintiffs to build a sea wall had effected a taking of the plaintiffs' 
property by inverse condemnation because without the sea wall it was 
impossible for them to develop their lotS.161 The Oregon Court of 
Appeals determined that there was no taking because the public's 
right to use the beach was senior, and thereby superior, to the prop-
erty interests of the plaintiffs.l62 The court reasoned that because the 
public had always had the right to walk on the beach, the denial of 
the permit for the sea wall did not take anything that was ever 
included in the plaintiffs' property rightS.163 The court thus concluded 
that no taking occurred under either the Oregon Constitution or the 
United States Constitution.l64 
IV. INCLUDING WILDLIFE IN THE PUBLIC TRUST 
Many legal scholars have predicted that the public trust doctrine 
eventually might become a useful tool for the protection of wildlife, 
but none have explored the issue in depth.l65 However, the ground-
157Id. 
158 Meltz, supra note 116, at 408. 
159 835 P.2d 940, 941-42 (Or. App. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1332 (1994). 
160 Id. at 941. 
161Id. 
162 Id. at 942; see Jaunich, supra note 82, at 167 n.2. 
163 See id., at 941-42. 
164 Stevens, 835 P.2d at 942. 
165 See, e.g., Rieser, supra note 48, at 394; Searle, supra note 63, at 909; Bader, supra note 88, 
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work has long been laid for this development. As discussed above, the 
scope of the public trust doctrine has expanded consistently.166 Al-
though the public trust doctrine has been used in some cases to 
protect wildlife, in these cases wildlife has almost always been in-
cluded as part of a larger context.167 For example, many recent cases 
explicitly include the protection of wildlife under the umbrella of the 
public trust doctrine, but do so within the context of the protection of 
whole ecosystems.16S Predators like wolves are part of a natural eco-
system.169 
A. Setting the Stage for the Protection of Wildlife 
Contemporary commentators on the public trust doctrine have ar-
gued that the doctrine should be used as a tool for large-scale ecologi-
cal preservation, rather than to target particular species or natural 
landmarks.170 In her article, Ecological Preservation as a Public Prop-
erty Right, Professor Alison Rieser argues that the United States Su-
preme Court's implicit recognition of the public trust doctrine's appli-
cation to more than just water rights in Illinois Central v. Illinois and 
Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi indicates that ecological boundaries 
actually may be replacing the old navigability tests of the public trust 
doctrine.171 
The concentration on ecological boundaries first appeared in Marks 
v. Whitney, where the California Supreme Court held that Marks's 
title to land that was part of the San Francisco Bay was subject to 
at 761; see also Meyers, supra note 21, at 724 (Meyers's article discusses the idea of expanding 
the public trust doctrine to include wildlife, but does so on a more theoretical than legal basis.). 
166 See supra notes 79-115 and accompanying text. 
167 See, e.g., Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 674 (1st. Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981) (wildlife protected as part of ecosystem destroyed by an 
oil spill); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct. of Alpine Cty. (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 711 
(Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (wildlife protected as part of ecosystem of lake/res-
ervoir); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (en banc) (wildlife protected as part of 
ecosystem of tidelands). 
168 See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 709 (court considered Mono Lake as an entire 
ecosystem); Marks, 491 P.2d at 374 (court considered San Fransisco Bay as a whole "ecological 
unit"). 
169 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 35, at 391. In Professor Plater's opinion "Mono Lake may 
stand for the proposition that the public trust doctrine is capable of reaching out and encom-
passing the ecological values of an entire functioning ecosystem." [d. 
170 Bader, supra note 88, at 755. Bader suggests the public trust doctrine be used to "maintain 
the health of natural systems." [d. 
171 Rieser, supra note 48, at 405-06. Alison Reiser is an Associate Professor at the University 
of Maine School of Law and Director of the Marine Law Institute. [d. at 393. 
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protection by the state as part of the public trust.172 The court based 
its reasoning on principles of ecological preservation rather than on 
commerce.173 The court further noted that the "growing public recog-
nition that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands-a 
use encompassed within the tidelands trust-is the preservation of 
those lands in their natural state .... "174 The San Francisco Bay 
should be preserved in its natural state so that the lands "may serve 
as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environ-
ments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and 
which favorably affect the scenery and the climate of the area."175 The 
court's emphasis on conservation in Marks is a departure from earlier 
use of the public trust doctrine, allowing public access to a resource.176 
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County 
(Mono Lake) relied successfully on the holding of Marks over ten 
years later to support the expansion of the public trust doctrine to 
protect the biotic community of Mono Lake.177 At issue in Mono Lake 
was the scenic beauty and ecological value of the lake, rather than the 
lake's navigability.178 Mono Lake is a saline lake fed by five fresh water 
tributaries.179 In 1940, the Department of Public Works of the City of 
Los Angeles purchased a grant to appropriate virtually the entire 
flow of four of the five tributaries to provide water for Los Angeles.180 
By 1983, the diversion of the fresh water had caused the lake to drop 
and had increased the lake's salinity such that there were severe 
impacts on the wildlife dependent on the lake.181 The plaintiffs in Mono 
Lake brought suit to protect not rights of fishing,182 or navigation, but 
"the scenic views of the lake and its shore, the purity of the air, and 
the use of the lake for nesting and feeding by birds."183 Relying ex-
pressly on the public trust doctrine, the California Supreme Court 
172 Marks, 491 P.2d at 380. 
173 Rieser, supra note 48, at 407. 
174 Marks, 491 P.2d at 380. 
1751d. 
176 See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
177 National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). 




182 National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 711. Mono Lake is saline and supports only brine 
shrimp.ld. 
183 ld. at 719. The dropping water level connected the islands in the lake with the mainland, 
allowing predators to destroy the gull population. ld. at 716. The dropping water level also 
produced a fine salt dust that polluted the air. ld. 
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held that the original grant was not absolute and that Los Angeles's 
need for water had to be balanced against the severe impairment of 
the scenic beauty and ecological value of the lake. l84 According to the 
Court, the public trust interests in the wildlife and ecology of the lake 
were potentially more significant than Los Angeles's private property 
rights.185 
B. Applying the Public Trust to Wildlife 
While it generally is accepted that the public trust doctrine has 
"evolved into an amphibian, moving easily from the waters onto shore-
lands,"I86 many people have doubts about whether the doctrine can 
"shed the fins, the scales and the webbed feet to climb upland into the 
forests and mountains."187 Wildlife was always included in the package 
of property rights that no one can own-rights like water and air-
that have been traditionally the domain of the public trust doctrine. l88 
The United States Supreme Court recognized the inclusion of wildlife 
in the public trust in the 1896 case Geer v. Connecticut.189 Despite the 
Supreme Court's reversal on the issue of state ownership of wildlife, 
the original application of the public trust doctrine to wildlife was 
affirmed and strengthened by the Supreme Court's holding in Hughes 
v. Oklahoma.l90 
The idea of extending the public trust doctrine to wildlife was 
introduced in Gary Meyers's article, Variation on a Theme: Expand-
ing the Public Trust Doctrine to Include Protection of Wildlife. l91 
Meyers suggests that we should move towards a less homocentric 
approach to wildlife preservation.l92 Meyers argues that wildlife should 
be preserved for its own sake, rather than for its unknown potential 
184 Id. at 719-24. 
185 See Jaunich, supra note 82, at 180 (arguing that although at the time Los Angeles was 
granted water rights in 1940 the public trust doctrine was not generally accepted to cover 
wildlife or aesthetic values, the California Supreme Court considered these public trust interests 
to be greater than the private property interest given by the water rights grant). 
186 Reed, supra note 58, at 107. 
187Id. 
188 SANDERS, supra note 59, at 158. Campbell, however, argues that, "[tlhe trend in recent 
years has been to expand the Public Trust Doctrine to protect wildlife, non-navigable waters, 
and air, not covered traditionally by the doctrine." Campbell, supra note 19, at 83. This argument 
is flawed because wildlife, air, and non-navigable waters were traditionally covered. SANDERS, 
supra note 59, at 158. 
189 161 U.S. 519, 523 (1896), rev'd on other grounds, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
190 441 U.S. at 322. 
191 Meyers, supra note 21, at 724. 
192Id. 
------------------------------------------ - ---
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benefits for humans.193 Meyers sees the public trust as furthering this 
more worldly view by offering a forum that encompasses the value of 
wildlife apart from its economic value or lack thereof to humans.194 
Meyers stresses the physical similarities between water and wild-
life,195 and emphasizes that both wildlife and water cannot be owned 
by individuals and historically have been viewed as owned by the 
state in trust for the public good.196 Looking back to the treatment of 
both wildlife and water in Roman law as res nullius or res commu-
nis,197 Meyers argues that the public trust doctrine was always meant 
to include wildlife, but has artificially been limited to water by centu-
ries of wrongful interpretations of courtS.198 
While most courts have limited use of the public trust doctrine to 
cases concerning water rights,199 a small minority have already opened 
the door for including wildlife in the public trust.2OO In Geer v. Con-
necticut, the United States Supreme Court, upholding the constitu-
tionality of a Connecticut statute prohibiting the transportation of 
game outside of state boundaries, looked back to the ownership clas-
sifications of Roman law and held that natural resources including 
wildlife belong in common to all citizens of a state.201 The Court held 
that natural resources should be kept "as a trust for the benefit of the 
people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the government, 
as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private individuals as 
distinguished from the public good."202 While Geer was overruled as a 
violation of the Commerce Clause in the 1979 case Hughes v. Okla-
homa,203 the Supreme Court took the opportunity to affirm its appli-
cation of the public trust doctrine to wildlife, stating that "the general 
rule we adopt in this case makes ample allowance for preserving ... 
the legitimate state concerns for conservation and protection of wild 
animals underlying the 19th Century legal fiction of state owner-
193 [d. 
194 [d. at 726-27. 
195 [d. at 729. 
196 Meyers, supra note 21, at 729. 
197 See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. 
198 Meyers, supra note 21, at 728-29 n.23. 
199 See supra notes 79--100 and accompanying text. 
200 See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 519 (1896), rev'd on other grounds, Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1917); In re Steuart 
Transp., 495 F. Supp. 38, 38 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
201 Geer, 161 U.S. at 519, 522-23. 
202 [d. at 529. 
203 441 U.S. at 325. 
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ship."204 The sentiment that wildlife is an integral part of the public 
trust and that wildlife should be protected by the government contin-
ues as a slim but constant thread running from even before Geer 
through the present.205 
The Court of Appeals of New York relied on Geer in Barrett v. State 
and held that the New York legislature's reintroduction of wild beaver 
into the Adirondacks was done in the state's capacity as a trustee for 
the people, and was done for the interests of the public at large.206 The 
court held that: 
[t]he police power is not to be limited to guarding merely the 
physical or material interests of the citizen. His moral, intellectual 
and spiritual needs may also be considered. The eagle is pre-
served, not for its use but for its beauty. The same thing may be 
said of the beaver. They are one of the most valuable of the 
fur-bearing animals of the state. They may be used for food. But 
apart from these considerations their habits and customs, their 
curious instincts and intelligence place them in a class by them-
selves. Observation of the animals at work or play is a source of 
never-failing interest and instruction. If they are to be preserved 
experience has taught us that protection is required.207 
The court's holding in Barrett is important because of the court's 
use of the public trust doctrine to justify the protection of wildlife and 
because of the court's focus on the importance of wildlife for reasons 
other than human consumption.208 The most important precedent set 
by Barrett however, is its holding-discussed below-that the rein-
troduction of the beavers did not constitute a taking by the state of 
the private property damaged as a result of this reintroduction.209 
Another case frequently cited to support the proposition that the 
public trust doctrine extends to wildlife is In re Steuart Transporta-
tion CO.21O This case addressed whether damages could be recovered 
by the State of Virginia and the federal government for more than 
30,000 migratory birds destroyed in an oil spil1.211 The party respon-
sible for the oil spill, the Steuart Transportation Company, moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that neither the federal government 
204 I d. at 335-36. 
205 See Searle, supra note 63, at 910 n.15. 
206 Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99,100 (N.Y. 1917). 
207Id. at 101. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. 
210 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
211 Id. at 39 (The spill occurred February 2, 1976 in the Chesapeake Bay.). 
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nor Virginia could claim compensation because neither party "owned" 
the birds.212 Conceding that the birds were owned by no one, Virginia 
and the United States argued that the government had the right to 
sue for damages because under the public trust doctrine, the govern-
ment may act in its capacity as trustee to protect the public's interest 
in preserving natural wildlife resources.213 In denying the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment, the United States District Court for 
Virginia held that the federal government and the states have a 
"[r Jight and duty to protect and preserve the public's interest in 
natural wildlife resources. Such right does not derive from ownership 
of resources but from a duty owing to people."214 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, further 
supports the proposition that wildlife is part of the public trust.215 S.S. 
Zoe Colocotroni concerned an oil barge that ran aground on a reef off 
of the Puerto Rican coast.216 In order to dislodge the boat, the crew 
dumped crude oil into the ocean, whereupon the crude oil drifted to 
the shore of a mangrove forest causing considerable damage to the 
flora and fauna of the area.217 Puerto Rico brought suit to recover for 
the damage done to the wildlife, claiming that, as the public trustee 
of natural resources, the Commonwealth had a regulatory interest in 
wildlife.218 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
did not decide the issue as to whether Puerto Rico could recover 
under the public trust doctrine because it found that Puerto Rico had 
an independent right to conserve its natural resources.219 Puerto Rico's 
independent right to recovery came under a statue authorizing the 
co-plaintiff, the Environmental Quality Board, power to recover for 
the total value of damages done to wildlife and other natural resources.220 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit approved of 
the public interests served by the statute, commenting that: 
[in] recent times, mankind has become increasingly aware that the 
planet's resources are finite and that portions of the land and sea 
which at first glance seem useless, like salt marshes, barrier reefs, 
and other coastal areas, often contribute in subtle but critical 
212 [d. 
213 [d. at 40. 
214 [d. 
215 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 671 (1980), cert. denied, 
450 U.S. 912 (1981). 
216 [d. at 657-58. 
217 [d. at 658. 
218 [d. at 671. 
219 [d. 
220 S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d at 671. 
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ways to an environment capable of supporting both human life 
and other forms of life on which we all depend.221 
381 
From the court's recognition of the value of Puerto Rico's attempt 
to discourage the destruction of natural resources, it may be implied 
that had Puerto Rico not provided explicitly for recovery for damage 
to wildlife in the statute, the court would have considered favorably 
the Commonwealth's claim under the public trust doctrine.222 
Cases such as Zoe and In re Steuart Tranportation Co. have helped 
to establish a thin but definite thread of judicial precedent and sup-
port for the extension of the public trust doctrine to wildlife.223 In 
Roman times wildlife was seen as res nullius-owned by no one.224 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed this status and concur-
rently affirmed the public trust doctrine in its holding in Geer v. 
Conneticut that wildlife is in trust for the benefit of the people.225 This 
holding and the policy of protecting natural resources that lies behind 
it has guided courts up to the present time.226 Due to growing concern 
over the destruction of natural resources, the public trust doctrine 
appears poised to reemerge as a useful tool not only in encouraging a 
less "homocentric" vision of the world as Meyers advocates,227 but also 
in its capacity as a background notion of property law to defeat 
wildlife takings claims.228 
C. The Public Trust Doctrine Immunizing "Takings" by Wildlife 
The power of the public trust doctrine has been underutilized due 
to mistaken notions that "the scope of the immunizing power of the 
public trust remains largely unquestioned and fully unresolved,"229 
and that the public trust doctrine is based only on "tremendous mys-
tical and romantic appeal."230 The fact, however, is that not only is the 
221 [d. at 674. 
222 See id. 
223 See supra notes 186-222 and accompanying text. 
224 See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. 
225 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896), rev'd on other grounds, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 
441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
226 See supra notes 79-115 and accompanying text. 
227 Meyers, supra note 21, at 727. 
228 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901--02 (1992), on remand, 
424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992). 
229 Stephen Tan, Note, The Watchtower Casts No Shadow: Nonliability of Federal and State 
Governments For Property Damage Caused By Wildlife, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 427, 444 (1990). 
230 Lazarus, supra note 60, at 632. 
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public trust doctrine solidly grounded in law, but its immunizing power 
has been proven and its scope continues to groW.231 
The public trust doctrine was used successfully to challenge a tak-
ings claim in the 1917 case, Barrett v. State.232 Barrett concerned a suit 
by property owners against the State of New York for damage caused 
to valuable woodlands by the reintroduction of beavers.233 In holding 
for the state, the New York Court of Appeals found that there was 
no taking because, under the public trust doctrine, the government, 
in its capacity as trustee, had a right to reintroduce the animals.234 The 
court reasoned: 
[w]herever protection is accorded [to wildlife] harm may be done 
to the individual. Deer or moose may browse on his crops; mink 
or skunks kill his chickens; robins eat his cherries. In certain cases 
the Legislature may be mistaken in its belief that more good than 
harm is occasioned. But this is clearly a matter which is confined 
to its discretion. It exercises a governmental function for the 
benefit of the public at large and no one can complain of the 
incidental injuries that may result.235 
The court explained that the public trust overcame the takings 
claim because the state "owned" the beavers in its capacity as trustee 
and had a right to protect them for the benefit of all the people.236 The 
court recognized that the reintroduction incidentally had caused dam-
age to private forests, but saw greater value in the beavers-"a 
species of natural wealth which without special protection would be 
destroyed."237 
Modern legislatures should have the same confidence in their ability 
to regulate for the protection of wildlife as the State of New York had 
in 1917. There are fortunately, glimmers of a reemergence of this 
confidence. In Clajon v. Petera, the United States District Court for 
the District of Wyoming relied on the public trust doctrine in holding 
that a Wyoming statute regulating hunting was not a taking of plain-
tiff's private property rights.238 The defendants in Clajon, members 
231 See supra notes 116-64 and accompanying text. 
232 116 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1917). See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text for discussion 
of Barrett. 
233 Barrett, 116 N.E. at 100. 
234 [d. at 102. 
235 [d. at 100. 
236 [d. 
237 [d. 
238 Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843, 850 (D. Wyo. 1994). The court refers to the 
public trust impliedly in its reliance on "an ancient property doctrine dating back to the earliest 
days of the common law." [d. at 852. 
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of the Wyoming Game and Fish Department, failed to argue for 
application of the public trust doctrine.239 The court independently 
decided that the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel was 
controlling, although neither party had cited to the case.240 Quoting 
from the Supreme Court's holding in Geer v. Connecticut, the 1896 
case that explicitly found wildlife to be covered by the public trust,241 
the court found it "well settled that wild animals are not the private 
property of those whose land they occupy, but are instead a sort of 
common property whose control and regulation are to be exercised 
'as a trust for the benefit of the people."'242 The court then held that, 
taking into account the Supreme Court's holding in Lucas, there was 
no physical taking of the plaintiffs' land because of the "ancient prop-
erty doctrine dating back to the earliest days of the common law" 
which holds that animals are owned by no one, whereby the state is 
not responsible for the animals' actions.243 There was no regulatory 
taking because the court determined under Hughes v. Oklahoma and 
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel that the state as trustee 
has the power to regulate to protect wildlife for the benefit of the 
public at large.244 
The District Court in Clajon supported its claim that there was no 
physical taking of the plaintiffs' property with reference to Moerman 
v. State.245 In Moerman, the First District Court of Appeals of Cali-
fornia relied on the public trust doctrine, holding that there was no 
physical or regulatory taking of Moerman's property by statutorily 
protected tule elk which had damaged his fences and consumed his 
livestock's feed.246 Comparing the situation to that of the reintroduc-
tion of the beaver in Barrett v. State, the court held that the state's 
attempt to return the tule elk to areas where it was once 500,000 
strong did not make the state responsible for the damage to Moer-
man's property.247 The court found it "[c]learly ... unreasonable to 
argue that because the animals were once eliminated from Lake and 
239 See id. at 850. 
240 [d. (citing Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423 (lOth Cir. 1986) (en bane)), 
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987). 
241 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 519 (1896), rev'd on other grounds, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 
441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
242 Clajon, 854 F. Supp. at 850. 
243 [d. at 852. 
244 [d. at 85l. 
245 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 329 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1539 (1994). 
246 [d. at 332-35. 
247 [d. at 333. 
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Mendocino Counties and driven to the brink of extinction, that they 
are now nothing more than a public improvement or pet, under the 
control of the state."248 The affirmation of Geer v. Connecticut's holding 
that the public trust doctrine does include wildlife, in Barrett v. State, 
in Moerman, and in Clajon v. Petera, indicates that the public trust 
doctrine may be on the brink of receiving the recognition it deserves. 
In states where use of the public trust doctrine has been established 
as a "background notion of property law,"249 the built-in loophole in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council should permit governmen-
tal protection of wildlife without crippling compensation demands. 
V. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF "TAKINGS" BY WILDLIFE 
Most courts have held that the government does not have to com-
pensate private property owners for damage caused by wildlife.250 The 
rationale of these courts, however, has not focused on anyone strong, 
articulable theory. Generally, courts that hold that damage caused by 
wildlife on private property is not a taking do so under a traditional 
takings analysis.251 The courts investigate first, whether there has 
been a permanent physical taking-also known as a taking "per se"-
and second, whether there has been a regulatory taking that has 
resulted in no economically viable remaining use of the property.252 
The problem with this traditional takings analysis is that while the 
analysis often has been successful in holding that animals cannot 
commit takings,253 the analysis itself has come under considerable 
attack. Most seriously, the analysis ignores the exception laid out in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council for background principles 
of property law, such as the public trust doctrine, that have the 
potential to provide a much firmer defense of wildlife. 
248 [d. 
249 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901--D2 (1991), on remand, 424 
S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992). 
250 Jeffrey E. Thompson, Note, Damage Caused by Reintroduced Wildlife: Should the Gov-
ernment be Held Accountable?, 4 U. ILL. L. REV. 1183, 1183 (1992). 
251 See supra notes 131-41 and accompanying text. 
252 [d. 
253 See, e.g., Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1334-36 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 
(1989) (no taking where protected grizzly bear ate sheep); Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. 
Supp. 843, 852-53 (D. Wyo. 1994) (regulations on hunting wildlife on private property not a 
taking); Leger v. Louisiana Dep't of Wildlife and Fisheries, 306 So.2d 391, 394-95 (La. App. 1975) 
(no taking where birds and deer ate crops). 
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A. Physical Takings 
In arguing that the presence of wildlife on private property is not 
a per se taking by physical occupation, the government has stressed 
the fact that it neither owns nor controls wildlife, and thus cannot be 
held responsible for any damage that wildlife may cause landowners.254 
For example, in Christy v. Hodel, Christy, a sheep farmer, was fined 
$2,500 for killing a grizzly bear to protect his sheep.255 The plaintiffs 
in Christy appealed the fine, claiming that there was a physical taking 
of their property because the sheep were "destroyed, killed, and 
rendered absolutely useless by the bear's act."256 The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the bears 
had physically taken the sheep, but held that the government was not 
responsible for the bears' action.257 The plaintiffs then claimed that 
there was a physical taking because the protected grizzly bears were 
on the land as "governmental agents."258 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that 
the grizzly bears were on the land as "governmental agents" because 
of the protection afforded them under the Endangered Species Act 
and Montana grizzly bear regulations.259 The court stressed that the 
government's protection of the grizzly bears did not result in govern-
ment ownership or contro1.260 
In response to the United States Court of Appeals's flat rejection 
of the argument that protected animals are "government agents," 
those advocating compensation for damage caused by wildlife have 
254 See, e.g., Christy, 857 F.2d at 1335 (it is pure fantasy to talk of "owning" wild fish, birds, or 
animals); Clajon, 854 F. Supp. at 853 (wild animals are ferae naturae and cannot be owned by 
anyone unless physically possessed). 
255 Christy, 857 F.2d at 1326-27. Christy bought land adjacent to Glacier National Park, in 
Glacier County Montana, from the Blackfeet Indian Tribe in 1982, intending to start a sheep 
ranch. [d. at 1326. During the eight-day period between July 1, 1982 and July 9, 1982 the bears 
killed twenty sheep, worth $1,200. [d. 
256 [d. at 1334 (emphasis in original). 
257 [d. 
258 [d. 
259 [d.; see also Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843, 852 (D. Wyo. 1994) (wild animals' 
presence on private property and consumption of livestock's food not a taking); Moerman v. 
State, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 329, 331 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1993) (reintroduced tule elk that destroyed 
plaintiff's fences and consumed food intended for plaintiff's livestock not "instrumentalities of 
the state" so no taking found). Courts also have rejected per se takings claims on the grounds 
that animals by their nature cannot constitute a permanent physical invasion because they 
"roam about freely and ... are anything but permanent fixtures." Clajon, 854 F. Supp. at 853. 
260 Christy, 857 F.2d at 1335. 
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formulated more sophisticated arguments. One theory left open in 
Christy is whether wildlife specifically relocated by the government 
legitimately can be seen as "instrumentalities of the government."261 
One commentator has argued: 
[b]ecause most reintroduction programs involve species that have 
been absent from an area for a period of time, the reintroduced 
wildlife will not be born or produced naturally in the region and 
will not be considered indigenous wildlife. As a result, the govern-
ment should maintain responsibility for all the harm caused by the 
wildlife it releases.262 
Another commentator, Geoffrey Harrison, has taken this theory a 
step further, suggesting that it is not necessary to prove that wild 
animals are "government agents" for there to be a physical taking.263 
Harrison argues that if cable wiring264 and random passersby on the 
beach265 can be held to effect takings, then so too can wild animals, for 
a random passerby is no more permanent than an animal, and a cable 
box is no more a government agent than a bear.266 Under Harrison's 
theory, government ownership or lack thereof ceases to be a factor.267 
The public trust doctrine makes a much stronger case than tradi-
tional takings analysis for holding that there can be no physical tak-
ings by wildlife. Although the government has been successful in 
defeating plaintiffs' claims of takings per se by wildlife by stating that 
the government neither owns nor controls wildlife and therefore should 
not be responsible for damage caused by wildlife, this position is, as 
outlined above, subject to arguably valid attack.268 The public trust 
doctrine should not be ignored when the Supreme Court's decision in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council has made a special excep-
tion for "background notions of property law."269 Arguably, the public 
trust doctrine is a background notion of property law.270 According to 
the public trust doctrine, the presence of wildlife on private property 
261 [d. at 1335 n.9. 
262 Thompson, supra note 250, at 1206. 
263 Geoffrey L. Harrison, Note, The Endangered Species Act and Ursine Usurpation's: A 
Grizzly Tale of Two Takings, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1101, 1114 (1991). 
264 Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
265 NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,832 (1987). 
266 Harrison, supra note 263, at 1114. 
267 [d. 
268 See supra notes 250-64 and accompanying text. 
269 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901-02 (1992), on remand, 424 
S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992). 
270 See supra notes 71-100 and accompanying text. 
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cannot constitute a taking.271 Private landowners never have been 
understood to own the wildlife on their property.272 Therefore, nothing 
is taken from landowners when they are prevented from destroying 
or killing animals.273 Likewise, the public trust doctrine overrides the 
argument that the government should be forced to compensate for 
reintroduced wildlife that causes damage to private property owners. 
Since a private property owner's land always has been subject to use 
by wildlife, driving the wildlife to extinction in an area should not 
result in compensation when efforts are made for its rehabilitation.274 
Finally, the public trust doctrine overcomes the argument that wild-
life, like a cable box or a random passerby on beachfront property, 
effects a taking because it is on private land only by governmental 
regulation and approval. Wildlife, unlike a cable box and unlike other 
people, always has had the prior, natural right to inhabit private land. 
B. Regulatory Takings 
The government focuses on traditional takings analysis in arguing 
that the Endangered Species Act275 and other federal and local wildlife 
protection acts276 do not constitute regulatory takings. The traditional 
test for a regulatory taking, as defined by Justice Scalia in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, is whether a "regulation denies all 
economically beneficial or productive use of land."277 In Christy v. 
271 Lynda Graham Cook, Note, Lucas and Endangered Species Protection: When "Take" and 
"Takings" Collide, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185,208-09 (1993). 
[d. 
Classifying wildlife and its habitat as a public trust resource is important because 
landowners do not own the rights to trust resources located on their property .... 
Since the trust inheres in all property interests, landowners take fee simple title to an 
implied servitude restricting uses inconsistent with the public trust .... Therefore the 
public trust embodies the type of limitation the Lucas Court exempted from takings 
claims. 
272 [d.; see Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423, 1426 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987). "It is well settled that wild animals are not the private property of 
those whose land they occupy, but are instead a sort of common property whose control and 
regulation are to be exercised 'as a trust for the benefit of the people.'" Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423, 
1426. 
273 See id, at 1426. 
274 See id. at 1426-27. 
275 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994). 
276 See, e.g., WILD FREE-ROAMING HORSES AND BURROS ACT, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1994) 
(to protect wild horses from capture, branding, harassment, or death); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE 
§ 3951 (West 1970) (to protect tule elk). 
277 Lucas V. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992), on remand, 424 S.E.2d 
484 (S.C. 1992). 
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Hodel, the plaintiffs argued as an alternative to finding a taking per 
se, that there was a regulatory taking of their property.278 The Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that there was not a regulatory 
taking of Christy's property because the Endangered Species Act 
itself left Christy "in full possession of the complete 'bundle' of prop-
erty rights to [his] sheep."279 The court differentiated between the 
unintentional effect of the act-the killing of the sheep-and its regu-
latory purpose of protecting endangered wildlife.280 Looking at the 
regulations themselves the court held that they neither "purport to 
take, or even to regulate the use of, the plaintiffs' property" adding, 
"[p ]erhaps because plaintiffs recognize this fact, they choose to focus 
on the conduct of the bears."281 
Those who believe that the Endangered Species Act is merely an 
excuse for "unconstitutional, uncompensated" takings of private land 
have fought the ESA by proposing interpretations of the takings 
clause that require much less than a 100% taking of the whole prop-
erty.282 One such proposal, specifically targeted to oppose the Endan-
gered Species Act, is The Just Compensation Act of 1993.283 The Just 
Compensation Act calls for federal compensation for "any diminution" 
in the value of property.284 As discussed above, the United States 
Supreme Court, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, left 
open the issue as to how much a private property right has to be 
infringed upon before a taking occurs.285 
The public trust doctrine diffuses the threat of legislation that 
would demand compensation for any diminution in property value. 
Just as the public trust doctrine can defeat the argument that wildlife 
can effect a physical taking, the doctrine also can defeat the argument 
that the Endangered Species Act and similar wildlife protection stat-
utes create regulatory takings. Wildlife has existed on the earth longer 
than humans, and under the public trust doctrine this prior right to 
278 Christy, 857 F.2d at 1334. 
279Id. 
280 Id. Other examples of government regulations held not to effect takings despite their 
burden on certain individuals are the prohibition amendment, Hamilton v. Kentucky Distill-
eries, 251 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1919), and rent control, Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 512 
(1944). 
281 Christy, 857 F.2d at 1334. 
282 Bruce Babbitt, The Endangered Species Act and "Takings": A Callfor Innovation Within 
the Terms of the Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355, 357 (1994). 
283 H.R. 1388, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
284 Babbitt, supra note 282, at 357. 
285 See supra notes 134--64 and accompanying text. 
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the land is recognized.286 When land is purchased, the species that live 
upon it are not included in the title.287 Therefore, government regula-
tions protecting wildlife take nothing that the landowner can claim as 
his or her own.288 Furthermore, as Secretary of the Interior Bruce 
Babbitt points out, government could not function if it had to pay all 
those inconvenienced by regulatory actions for the benefit of the 
public at large.289 
C. A Return to The Gray Wolves 
The recent reemergence of the public trust doctrine in Moerman v. 
State and Clajon v. Petera should give the government more confidence 
in the validity of the reintroduction of wolves into Yellowstone Park.290 
Like the tule elk in Moerman, the wolves once were plentiful in 
Yellowstone Park.291 Due to federally sponsored plans of eradication, 
the species is now officially listed as endangered.292 Proponents of the 
wolf reintroduction,293 including Secretary of the Interior Bruce Bab-
bitt, see the reintroduction of the wolf to Yellowstone Park as a 
symbolic apology for past callousness to wildlife and an enhancement 
of Yellowstone as a national treasure.294 
Counterposing these supporters, are local ranchers who have been 
vocal in their disapproval of the reintroduction of the wolves.295 Al-
though the ranchers are in the minority, the government and public 
286 See Holmes Rolston III, Property Rights and Endangered Species, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 
283,300 (1990). Rolston comments that wildlife has occupied the earth for hundreds of thousands 
of years and "if anyone is a newcomer on the scene, it is the landowner, now so vociferously 
claiming his absolute property rights." Id. 
287 Cook, supra note 271, at 208-09. 
288 See Rolston, supra note 286, at 298. Rolston argues that "[i]f governments limit economic 
benefits because these threaten harm to general noneconomic values, then no compensation is 
required. People never had the right to do on their property what spills over and results in 
harm to other people." Id. 
289 Babbitt, supra note 282, at 358. 
290 Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843, 843 (D. Wyo. 1994); Moerman v. State, 21 
Cal. Rptr.2d 329 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1539 (1994). 
291 William K. Stevens, WolfE Howl Heralds Change for Old Haunts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
1995, at Cl. The world population of wolves has been reduced from approximately one million 
to around 100,000. Id. 
292Id. 
293 The wolf recovery plan generated 160,000 public comments to the Fish and Wildlife Service, 
the greatest response to any federal action. The majority of commentators were supportive of 
the wolves reintroduction. See Milstein, supra note 18, at E-l. 
294 See Jim Klobuchar, Wolf Controversy An Ideological Geyser in Yellowstone, STAR TRIB. 
Feb. 14, 1995, at 3B. 
295Id. 
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supporters of the wolves have gone to great lengths to placate them.296 
The government reintroduced the endangered wolves to Yellowstone 
as a "nonessential experimental" population, a classification that al-
lows the killing of wolves proved to have killed livestock.297 Defenders 
of Wildlife, a public conservation group, has set up a fund, largely 
supported by school children, from which ranchers are to be compen-
sated for any losses.298 These placating compromises are not only 
ineffective in silencing the opposition, but they may be entirely un-
necessary. Where the public trust doctrine is a background principle 
of property law, the public trust doctrine's protection of wildlife may 
mean that government has not only a right to protect wolves or other 
endangered wildlife, but a duty to preserve them. The wolf should not 
stop being protected by the public trust doctrine once it attacks 
livestock.299 The public trust doctrine should not be undermined by 
unnecessary compromises. The public trust doctrine is an important 
factor for courts to consider in future takings analysis involving wild-
life. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Originating in Roman times, the idea of a public trust for resources 
that cannot be owned by individuals has taken on special meaning 
today when the resources the Emperor Justinian spoke of-the water, 
the air, and wildlife-are threatened by unforeseeable demands of 
human consumption.30o The public trust doctrine has developed dy-
namically over time, expanding from the past artificial limitation to 
water rights to the present day application to wildlife.301 This exten-
296 See Chadwick, supra note 7, at 15. Chadwick points out that: 
[d. 
[c]ritics complain that the ESA too often blocks development. Yet statistics show that 
it ends up only modifying development. Out of 98,237 interagency consultations be-
tween 1987 and 1992, just 55 projects were stopped cold. Officials look first to federal 
lands and other public domains such as state parks to carry out protection and recovery 
efforts. But because wildlife is a public resource, the government has some authority 
to prevent the destruction of listed species on private property as well. 
297 [d. 
298 Milstein, supra note 18, at El. Defenders of Wildlife has established a $100,000 Wolf 
Compensation Fund to pay fair market value to every rancher verified to have lost livestock in 
wolf attacks. [d. 
299 Livestock is not included under the public trust doctrine because livestock is not "ferae 
naturae" -wildlife belonging to no one-they are instead domesticated animals owned privately. 
See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
300 See supra notes 52--B4 and accompanying text. 
301 See supra notes 165-228 and accompanying text. 
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sion may allow the public trust to trump private claims of takings 
under the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court's decision in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council particularly made exception for 
"background notions of property law," and the public trust doctrine 
appears to fit into this exception in many cases.302 The idea that the 
public trust doctrine is an ancient romantic notion is false. It is poten-
tially an effective modern day legal tool for promoting regulations 
protecting endangered wildlife. 
302 See supra notes 250-99 and accompanying text. 
